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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
When considering the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) the first characteristic 
that struck me was the fact that the goals and targets were not new, when endorsed by 
world leaders in 2000.1 Upon further consideration, especially of documents related to 
the implementation of the MDGs a second characteristic emerged: the integrated 
approach that relevant documents adopt towards development, often accompanied by 
the assertion that the MDGs embody basic human rights.2  
The first characteristic – not new – prompted me to engage in some 
archeological research.3 The findings of that research led to the following question. 
Why have we not done better, given that the MDGs have been part of human rights 
law for six decades?  This essay points to the fragmented nature of the international 
institutional framework – or international governance structure – as a factor that has 
contributed to our failure. This fragmented institutional setting – also not new – has 
led to a fragmented approach to international law.4 Finally, this essay considers how 
international law, despite its fragmented nature, might further the integrated approach 
evident from the MDGs. In this essay I assume that the fragmented nature of the 
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international institutional framework is unlikely to undergo significant change in the 
near future, given the limited outcome of the 2005 World Summit in this respect.5  
International law and international governance structures of course are only 
two interrelated factors that determine whether the MDGs will be met. The allocation 
of financial resources for development by developing and developed states and their 
effective use,6 linked to proper governance structures at national level,7 probably are 
among the most important factors that will determine the fate of the MDGs.  And, 
there is reason for concern on these accounts as well.  
 
At various world summit meetings, donor countries have pledged to increase aid 
from $80 billion in 2004 to $130 billion in 2010 (at constant 2004 prices). The 
present rate of increase of aid for core development programmes (excluding debt 
relief) will have to more than double over the next three years if the level of aid 
committed for 2010 is to be met. As of 2008, only $21 billion of the additional 
ODA commitments has been delivered or programmed. At the summit meeting of 
the Group of Eight in Gleneagles, Scotland, in 2005, its members made a 
commitment to double ODA to Africa by 2010. Preliminary data for 2007 show 
that, excluding debt relief, bilateral ODA to the region has increased by no more 
than 9 per cent since 2005.8 
 
The high-level event, held on September 25, 2008, did not change the situation 
significantly, even if it resulted in promises of up to about $ 16 billion for 
development.9  
Developing states themselves also allocate insufficient financial resources 
towards development.  The water and sanitation sector provides a relevant example. 
In this case the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimates that a state 
should allocated up to 1% of its gross national product (GDP) to providing water and 
sanitation, however, states on average allocate 0.5% of GDP to these aims.10 In 
addition, UNDP also estimates that aid for water and sanitation will have to double, 
rising by US $ 3.6 to 4.0 annually, if the MDG-target on water and sanitation is to be 
met.11 
 Sufficient financial resources, including aid, its effective use and good 
governance at national and international levels thus are essential elements for 
attaining the MDGs. In this essay I explore only one facet of these elements: good 
governance at the international level and more in particular the repercussions of the 
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fragmented international institutional structure for the attainment of the MDGs. Prior 
to doing that, however, a bit of archeological research is called for. 
 
2 ARCHEOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
 
Delving into the archeological layers of international law illustrates that most, if not 
all, MDGs either are implicated in or can be related to human rights law. Moreover, 
some MDGs have found expression also in other legally binding or non-binding 
documents. In addition, some MDGs take away from earlier commitments endorsed 
by states. The water related target, which is target 3 under MDG 7, and MDG 2 on 
universal primary education provide pertinent examples.  
Target 3, under MDG 7, expresses the commitment to halve the proportion of 
the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation 
by 2015. This target clearly falls short of the right to water endorsed at the 1977 
United Nations Water Conference and the goal set at that conference, i.e. to provide 
safe drinking water and sanitation to underserved urban and rural areas by 1990.12 In 
2002, the right to water, furthermore, was adopted by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) as part of the right to an adequate 
standard of living and the right to health, respectively articles 11 and 12 of the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Covenant), adopted in 
1966.13 ‘The right to a standard of living adequate for … health and well-being’, 
moreover, is also included in article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Universal Declaration), adopted in 1948. Furthermore, the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) conceive of the right to water as part of 
other rights, respectively the right to enjoy adequate living conditions for rural women 
and the right to health.14 Agreeing to halve the number of people without access to 
safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015 evidently means that what was 
promised in 1977, for delivery in 1990, will not be met in 2015 and that for millions 
of people the right to water will not materialize. Moreover, the United Nations has 
expressed doubts whether the target for sanitation will be met, estimating that it may 
be missed by 600 million people.15 Meeting the target is proving to be most difficult 
for Sub-Saharan Africa, given that between 1990 and 2004 the amount of people 
without access to sanitation in this region has increased from 335 to 440 million.16 
UNDP estimates that if the target as a whole is to be met at least US $ 10 billion per 
year will be required; assuming that low-cost sustainable technologies will be used.17 
Alternatively, the World Commission on Dams, in 2000, estimated that to 
comprehensively address the water crises, that is beyond basic needs, an extra 
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investment US $100 billion annually will be required in developing countries, until 
2025, in addition to the US $ 70-80 billion currently invested annually.18  
  The right to non-discriminatory access to primary education provides another 
example. The Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), adopted in 1946, formulates it as an aim of the 
organization.19 It, moreover, is formulated as the right to free and compulsory primary 
education in article 13 juncto article 14 of the ESCR Covenant and in article 28(1)(a) 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). It is now reflected in MDG 2, 
albeit without the proviso that primary education should be free. 
 The link between these two rights, the right to water and the right to primary 
education, especially for girls, also is pertinent. The task of fetching water is most 
often carried out by women and children, especially girls. As a result children, girls in 
particular, do not attend school and women cannot invest in childcare or earning an 
income. 20 Hence there is also a link between the right to water and MDG 3, on 
empowering women, and CEDAW. 
 As the table available on the website of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights illustrates all MDGs, and I suggest, all targets formulated under them can be 
related to provisions of the ESCR Covenant and other human rights instruments. 
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 W. J. Cosgrove and F. R. Rijsberman for the World Water Commission, World Water Vision, 
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20
 World Health Organization (WHO), The Right to Water (Geneva: WHO, 2003), a at 23-26 available 
at http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/rtwrev.pdf (accessed  September 1, 2008).. WHO 
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http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/millenium-development/achievement.htm (accessed 29 August 
2008) 
 
Linking the MDGs to human rights provisions may be less evident for the targets 
related to the environment, such as target 2 of MDG 7, which relates to loss of 
biodiversity, or target 1 of MDG 7, which relates integrating principles of sustainable 
development into policies and programs in order to reduce the loss of natural 
resources and includes issues such as deforestation, reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions and the protection of the ozone layer. However, I suggest that articles 11 
(right to an adequate standard of living), 12 (right to health) and 15(1)(b) (the right to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications) of the ESCR Covenant 
provide a basis for state duties regarding the protection of the environment. The 
reasoning used by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its judgment in 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros is relevant in this context. In that case the ICJ found that 
provisions setting out broad duties to protect the water quality of the Danube, 
contained in a treaty dating from 1977, could be regarded as ‘evolving provisions’, 
which required the parties to take into consideration newly developed environmental 
norms.21 Human rights provisions, including those on the right to an adequate 
standard of living and health, merit a similar approach with respect to, for example, 
standards to protect the environment that have been developed since the adoption of 
the relevant human rights instruments. The ‘living instrument’ doctrine, developed by 
the European Court of Human Rights, also suggests that such an approach to human 
rights provisions is warranted.22 
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 ICJ, Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) September 25,1997, para. 112. 
22
 It is settled case law of the ECHR that the European Convention on Human Rights is ‘a living 
instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’. In case of environmental 
protection this has resulted in the ECHR interpreting article 8 (right to respect for family and private 
life) to include the right to a healthy environment, which offers protection against, for example, 
harmful chemicals and offensive smells. See Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Costa, Ress, Türmen, 
Millennium Development Goals and human rights standards  
Millennium Development Goal  Key Related Human Rights Standards  
      
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 25(1); ICESCR article 11 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 25(1); ICESCR articles 13 and 14; CRC 
article 28(1)(a); CEDAW article 10; CERD article 5(e)(v) 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 2; CEDAW; ICESCR article 3; CRC 
article 2 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 25; CRC articles 6, 24(2)(a); ICESCR 
article 12(2)(a) 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 25; CEDAW articles 10(h), 11(f), 12, 
14(b); ICESCR article 12; CRC article 24(2)(d); CERD article 5(e)(iv) 
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 25; ICESCR article 12, CRC article 24; 
CEDAW article 12; CERD article 5(e)(iv) 
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 25(1); ICESCR articles 11(1) and 12; 
CEDAW article 14(2)(h); CRC article 24; CERD article 5(e)(iii) 
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development Charter articles 1(3), 55 and 56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights articles 22 and 
28; ICESCR articles 2(1), 11(1) , 15(4), 22 and 23; CRC articles 4, 24(4) and 28(3) 
ICES* ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) 
ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) 
CERD (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination) 
CEDAW (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) 
CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child) 
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 MDG 8, requiring amongst other things states to cooperate in attaining the 
MDGs, is reflected in the provisions of the United Nations Charter,23 the Universal 
Declaration24 and the ESCR Covenant25 as well as the CRC.26 In other words, the 
inter-state cooperation required by MDG 8 also is not new.  What might be regarded 
as new is the emphasis that MDG 8 places on cooperation with the private sector. 
However, articles 29 and 30 of the Universal Declaration, and perhaps also article 71 
of the UN Charter, may be taken to indicate the appropriateness of such cooperation. 
 How, then, might we assess the outcome of this bit of archeological research? 
Some might point to the many and varied conditions contained in, for example, the 
provisions of the ESCR Covenant, as well as the fact that many of the relevant 
provisions do not formulate rights but conditioned undertakings for states. Such an 
analysis might point to the therefore doubtful status of the relevant provisions as 
rights of individuals or groups or even duties on the part of states. It might thus seek 
to explain non-compliance by pointing to the texts involved and the underlying 
political tensions. It might, moreover, point to general principles of international law, 
particularly those contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the 
Rules on State Responsibility, as providing a legal framework in which violations of 
international can be addressed.27 
This essay takes a different path, one in which international human rights law, as 
well as other bodies of law, such international environmental law, is placed in the 
context of the fragmented international institutional framework. It presents the 
argument that when use is made of the potential that law offers: processes in which 
law can work in a context specific, rather then an abstract, manner compliance with 
human rights law, and thus the MDGs and also environmental law, may enhance.  
 
3 A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
It is a well known fact that the institutional structure that the United Nations Charter 
established for purposes of the development of economic and social policies, 
including human rights and environmental policies, is a disjointed one. Within this 
structure the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) exercises coordinating powers 
amongst a myriad of institutions, including specialized agencies which are 
autonomous international organizations, even if linked to the United Nations through 
agreements concluded with ECOSOC on the basis of article 63 of the UN Charter. 
The World Bank the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade 
                                                                                                                                      
Zupančač and Steiner (para. 2) in Hatton and others v. the United Kingdom  (8 July 2003 (Grand 
Chamber), Rep. of Judgements and Decisions 2003-VIII). For an overview of the case law of the 
ECHR regarding the protection of the environment see Daniel Garcia San José, Environmental 
Protection and the European Convention on Human Rights (Strasbourgh: Council of Europe, 2005). 
23
 Article 1 of the UN Charter, and its paragraph 3 in particular, provides a pertinent example, but other 
examples abound. 
24
 See, preamble, 6th paragraph, Universal Declaration. 
25
 E.g. article 1(1) of the ESCR Covenant. 
26
 Preamble, last paragraph, and e.g article 23(4), CRC.  
27
 This approach is taken in Koskenniemi, see at 13, para. 13, where the choice was made to focus on 
the substantive issues that may arise as a result of the fragmentation of international law. The study 
group, moreover, when referring to the institutional aspects of fragmentation of international law 
focused on the proliferation of courts and tribunals (at 247, para. 489), not the fragmented nature of 
law- and policy-making as such, which it treats as a given . See at 246, para. 486 where it is stated that 
‘[A] key point made in this study, is that normative conflict is endemic to international law.   
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Organization (WTO) hold a special place in this system. The agreements that the 
World Bank and IMF have concluded with ECOSOC, contrary to similar agreements 
concluded with other specialized agencies, explicitly provide for their independence 
while the WTO is not a specialized agency even if it has concluded an agreement with 
United Nations.28 In addition, other organizations such as the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) operate outside the UN-system and 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), through their secretariats have 
various ties with a host of organizations, including the United Nations.29 In the words 
of the High-Level Panel, in its report in preparation of the 2005 World Summit: 
 
the institutional problem we face is twofold: first, decision-making on 
international economic matters, particularly in the areas of finance and trade, has 
long left the United Nations and no amount of institutional reform will bring it 
back; and second, the Charter allowed the creation of specialized agencies 
independent of principle United Nations organs, reducing the role of the 
Economic and Social Council to one of coordination.30 
 
This fragmented international institutional framework is also reflected in ESCR 
Covenant. The covenant links into the coordinating role attributed to ECOSOC by 
calling on ECOSOC to make arrangements with the specialized agencies for reporting 
on their activities relevant to the implementation of the covenant, calls on ECOSOC 
to transmit relevant information for study and recommendation to the then Human 
Right Commission, now Council, and provides that ECOSOC may bring to the 
attention of other UN bodies, including the General Assembly, and specialized 
agencies matters which arise out of its work and which may assist such bodies in 
taking measures to further implementation of the covenant.31 What the ESCR 
Covenant also illustrates is a cautious attitude when it comes to institutional 
competences. It, for example, in the aforementioned provision on specialized agencies 
and other bodies taking relevant measures, provides that each institution shall do so 
‘within its field of competence’.32 Moreover, article 24 of the ESCR Covenant reads 
as follows: 
 
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the specialized 
agencies which define the respective responsibilities of the various organs of the 
                                               
28
 On the World Bank and IMF’s agreements with ECOSOC see Mac Darow, Between Light and 
Shadow, The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Human Rights Law (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2003), 124-125. For the text of relevant agreements see 
http://unsystemceb.org/reference/system/agreements/ (accesses February 10, 2009). Note that the 
agreements that the World Bank and the IMF concluded explicitly provide that each of these 
organizations ‘is required to function, as an independent international organization’ in their articles 
I(2). Other agreements such as the one concluded with the WHO do not contain a similar provision. 
The relationship between the WTO and the United Nations is governed by the Arrangements for 
Effective Cooperation with other Intergovernmental Organizations – Relations Between the WTO and 
the United Nations, signed on November 15, 1995, available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_un_e.htm (accessed August 31, 2008).  
29
 Ellen Hey, ‘International Institutions’, Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds.), 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 749. 
30
 A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel (High-level Panel 
Report), UN doc. A/59/565, 2 December 2004, para. 274. 
31
 Articles 18-22, ESCR Covenant. 
32
 Art. 22, ESCR Covenant. 
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United Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with 
in the present Covenant. 
 
Article 24 of the covenant thus emphasizes that nothing beyond coordination is 
required and acceptable. The working methods adopted by the ESCR Committee fit 
into this approach by emphasizing coordination with other human rights bodies and 
drawing on the expertise of specialized agencies for its own work.33 Little, if 
anything, is found on how the Committee on ESCR might cooperate with those 
agencies in order to ensure an integrated approach to their tasks. 
In relationship to environmental protection article 25 of the ESCR Covenant is 
also of interest. It provides that ‘nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted 
as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy fully and freely their natural 
wealth and resources.’ Does this provision entail that measures to protect the 
environment regarding, for example, the protection of biodiversity could have been 
adopted on the basis of the covenant, given that they protect rights in that covenant, 
such as the right to health? That was probably not the intention of the drafters, who 
most likely sought to formulate what would later become known as the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources.34 Be this as it may, it is a fact that 
international measures to protect the environment have been adopted outside the 
framework of the ESCR Covenant, by way of MEAs in particular. 
 The fragmented international institutional framework can be traced to the 
functionalist thinking that guided the establishment of the United Nations and related 
institutions. In Mac Darrow’s words: 
 
The essential premise of functionalism … is that the role of international 
institutions should be the provision of services (e.g. food, health, employment) 
rather than fundamental unifying principles such as human rights, and moreover 
that responsibility for delivery of such services can be allocated in a decentralised 
or even ‘polycentralised’ fashion.35 
 
Within this functionalist approach to the international institutional setting, cooperation 
between international institutions, it was thought, did not need to extend beyond 
coordination and different interests could be articulated in different international 
forums.  As a result international institutions operate in relative isolation and, as the 
MDGs illustrate, services were not delivered, or at least remained under-delivered. 
The relative isolation in which international institutions operate harbors the 
risk that the policies regarding development of one institution take away from what 
the policies of another institution provide. For example, the fact that the WTO does 
not address tariffs, and also subsidies, for agricultural products, including fisheries, in 
developed states may entail that agricultural products from developing states, 
cultivated with technical cooperation projects financed by or through the FAO, face 
difficulties accessing world markets.36 Similarly, subsidized fishing activities continue 
                                               
33
 See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/workingmethods.htm (accessed August 31, 2008) 
34
 Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties in an 
Interdependent World, 1995 doctoral dissertation (on file with author), 53. Published under the same 
title with Cambridge University Press 1997 an in paperback in 2008. 
35
 Darrow, above note 28, at 205. Also see Koskenniemi, above note 4, 10-17. 
36
 See MDG Gap Task Force Report 2008, 21. Also see Kim Anderson, Will Martin and Ernesto 
Valenzuela, ‘The Relative Importance of Global Agricultural Subsidies and Market Access’ (March 
2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5569. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=912473 
(accessed February 10, 2009)..  
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to counteract the efforts undertaken within the Convention on Biological Diversity to 
conserve marine biodiversity.37 In addition, within the reconsideration of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding it has been pointed out that the WTO dispute 
settlement system which ultimately allows a state to impose countermeasures on a 
non-compliant state may disrupt the economies of developing states that impose such 
measures,38 economies which other international institutions, such as the World Bank 
and IMF, are seeking to strengthen. Whether lack of opportunities for farmers in 
developing countries, degrading biodiversity or disrupted economies, it is the poor 
that suffer most and see their human rights treaded on.39 
What, then, does the above imply for international law? It implies that 
different areas of international law also operate in relative isolation. In relation to the 
ESCR Covenant and other human rights treaties it implies that the implementation of 
their provisions are not necessarily part of the equation when, for example, structural 
adjustment projects are designed and implemented by international financial 
institutions.40 It also implies that in developing and implementing international 
environmental law, MEAs in particular, human rights aspects are not necessarily 
considered.  
The above is not to say that no integration has taken place between different 
functional areas of international law. A relevant example is the World Bank’s 
coordinating role in the implementation of MEAs in developing states. That role is 
achieved through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and other funds which are 
managed by the World Bank and through which financial resources are made 
available to developing states for implementing MEAs. This development, however, 
has entailed that the implementation of MEAs, at least to some extent, has become 
subject to the economic policies of the Bank and not necessarily to the considerations 
relevant in human rights agreements. A typical example is the notion of incremental 
costs, developed in the context of the World Bank. It entitles developing states to 
financial support for the part of a project that seeks to implement an MEA and 
contributes to the improvement of the global environment, i.e. not the part that 
contributes to the improvement of the local or national environment. This manner of 
proceeding implies that human rights law, e.g. the right to a healthy living 
environment, is not necessarily part of the equation when conceiving and 
implementing such projects. A more integrated approach, as advocated by the Human 
Development Report 2007/2008, entitled Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity 
in a Divided World, is likely to further human rights and thus the MDGs. The report 
provides ample evidence of inter-linkages between a variety of policy goals, for 
example, the link between MDG 1, on eradicating poverty and hunger, and climate 
change policy, part of MDG 7. 
The specific institutions established for the implementation of the MDGs thus 
operate in a fragmented institutional and legal framework. The MDG-institutions are 
based on the MDG Task Force, which is an advisory body of the UN Secretary-
                                               
37
 See Convention on Biological Diversity, In-depth Review of the Programme of Work on Incentive 
Measures, Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/9/12/Add.2, 28 April 2008, para. 38, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-09/official/cop-09-12-add2-en.pdf (accessed February 10, 
2009). 
38
 Andrea Bianchi, Lorenzo Gradoni and Mélanie Samson, Developing Countries, Countermeasures 
and WTO Law: Reinterpreting the DSU against the Background of International Law (Geneva: 
International centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), 2007) available at 
http://ictsd.net/i/publications/11294/ (accessed August 28, 2008).  
39
 See Investing in Development. 
40
 See Darow, above note 28. 
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General. Its members are representatives of key UN-offices, including the Office of 
High Commissioner for Human Rights; regional UN commissions and specialized 
agencies, including the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover the WTO and the OECD 
are also represented.41 In addition, relevant institutions have established their own 
MDG related programs which illustrate a concerted commitment to attaining the 
MDGs, and should be taken to imply more integrated approaches, including the 
integration of human rights into other policy areas, to development. 
What, then, might be the role of international law in supporting the attainment 
of the MDGs and the integrated approach reflected in relevant documents? 
 
4 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LEGAL MECHANISMS THAT PROMOTE INTEGRATED 
APPROACHES 
 
Based on a functionalist approach to the establishment of the United Nations and 
international institutions in general, we are now faced with a fragmented international 
institutional framework and fragmented international law. While the MDGs 
themselves do not attempt to address these issues as such, they do offer a unique 
opportunity for developing more integrated policy and legal approaches to the 
problems faced. Such opportunities are for example evident from the fact that the 
World Bank, if not the IMF and the WTO, participated in the  2007 dialogue with 
special agencies, funds and programs and other entities of the United Nations, 
organized  within the framework of the sixth inter-committee meeting of human rights 
treaty bodies.42 Such meetings may serve to further more integrated approaches to 
international policy and law and thus further the implementation of the MDGs.  
 But how might international law contribute to support the rather integrated 
approach evident from the MDGs and related documents? I suggest that given that 
rules in most cases are in place, procedures where law can be applied in context are 
particularly relevant. Such procedures are available, even if their development lags 
behind the development of substantive law. Relevant examples are the World Bank 
Inspection Panel as well as inspection panels established by other development banks 
and the Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters.43 Relevant is also the recent adoption of the Optional Protocol to the ESCR 
Covenant which, when it enters into force, will allow the submission of 
communications to the ESCR Committee by or on behalf of individuals or groups of 
individuals alleging to be victims of violations of the rights set forth in the covenant 
by a state party who is a party to the covenant and the protocol.44  
                                               
41
 For information on the MDG Gap Task Force see http://www.un.org/esa/policy/mdggap/ (accessed 
31 August 2008) 
42
 Report of the sixth inter-committee meeting of human rights treaty bodies para. 23 etc., Annex to 
Report of the chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies on their nineteenth meeting, contained in 
UN Doc. A/62/224, August 13, 2007. 
43
 For information on these mechanisms see Daniel Bradlow, ‘Private Complaints and International 
Organizations: A Comparative Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in International 
Financial Institutions’, 36 Georgetown Journal of International Law 2005, 403 and Svetlana 
Kravcenko, ‘The Aarhus  Convention and Innovations in Compliance with Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements’, 7 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 2007, 1. 
44
 Art. 1 and  2, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Report of the Human Rights Council, UNGA Doc A/63/453, November 28, 2008.   
 11 
Such procedures typically allow for the consideration of sustainable 
development not in the abstract but in a contextualized manner in which the interests 
of individuals and groups in society play an important role. Given that there seems to 
be overall agreement that the emphasis should be not on the development of new rules 
and norms, but on their implementation, it also seems appropriate that we move from 
more abstract law-making process to processes that enable law to work in context.  
This is what international law has to offer the MDGs, even if the legal system remains 
a fragmented system, it need not remain fragmented in its application, at least not as 
fragmented as it is today. Other proposals might also be relevant. These concern 
further institutionalized cooperation among human rights committees, by for example, 
developing joint general comments, a development endorsed during the 20th meeting 
of chairpersons of human rights treaty bodies in June 2008.45 A pertinent topic for a 
joint general comment would be the MDGs or sustainable development. Such a 
general comment could contribute towards developing more integrated approaches to 
the implementation MDGs and sustainable development more in general. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The links between the MDGs and the Universal Declaration and the ESCR Covenant 
is most striking: in all of six decades we have failed to live up to the provisions of 
those instruments, as well as many the provisions of various other instruments. This 
essay suggests that this development is linked to the fragmented international 
institutional structure, which is grounded in a politically fragmented world. In this 
fragmented world actors are able to use different functionally defined institutions to 
further their various interests in a fragmented manner. 
Does this mean that relevant human rights instruments did not matter during 
this 60 year time span? I doubt it.  I suggest that human rights instruments have 
mattered in the sense that they have provided those whose human rights are treaded 
on with a voice, including a voice in legal discourse. For example in the various 
inspection panels and compliance mechanisms where law can and is being 
contextualized, even if human rights law is not being applied directly by such bodies. 
Proliferation of such bodies expectedly leads to the next question, how to coordinate 
their activities?  While that question is becoming pertinent, given that complaints 
concerning a single situation or project have been submitted to various such bodies,46 
I suggest that a more important point to make, at present, is that even in a fragmented 
international institutional and legal order, procedures have been developed that allow 
                                               
45
 Report of the chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies on their twentieth meeting,  UN Doc 
A/63/280, 13 August 2008, para.42(s). 
46
 A relevant example is the Vlora Thermal Power Plant in Albania. Complaints regarding this project 
have been submitted to World Bank Inspection Panel (see 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:2132107
5~pagePK:64129751~piPK:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.html, accessed February 10, 2009), 
Independent Recourse Mechanisms of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (see 
http://www.ebrd.com/about/integrity/irm/register.htm, accessed February 10, 2009) and twice to the 
Aarhus Compliance Mechanism against Albania (see 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance/Compliance%20Committee/12TableAlbania.htm, accessed 
February 10, 2009) and against the European Community with regards to the European Investment 
Bank (see http://www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance/Compliance%20Committee/21TableEC.htm, 
accessed February 10, 2009).  
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for more integrated approaches to the application of different bodies of law relevant to 
sustainable development, and thus the MDGs, to emerge.  
